Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971

Joan B. Moore v. Prudential Insurance Company of America :
Petition For Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Thomas M. Burton; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Moore v. Prudential Insurance, No. 12388 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5428

This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

1
•••

JOAN B.. MOORE,

Respondent.

vs.

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Petitioner,

Case No.
12388

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

l
"r

THOMAS M. BURTON
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
Suite 300
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Petitioner,
Prudential Insurance
Company of America

RAYMOND M. BERRY
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent

I

Fl

I

l.

ED

Cle.-k, Supreme Court, Utah

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
'

li

PETITION FOR REHEARING ---------------------· 1
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING ------------------------------------···-····-····· 4
POINT I
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE APPLICATION AND EFFECT OF §31-19-S(c) 4
POINT II
§31-19-8 WAS CONSTRUED DIFFERENTLY AT TWO SEPARATE TRIALS OF
THIS CASE, CALLING FOR CONSTRUCTION OF SAID STATUTE BY THIS
COURT .................................................................... 7
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO
PROVE IT WOULD NOT IN GOOD
FAITH HA VE ISSUED THE POLICY. -··· 9
POINT IV
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE ESSENTIAL FACT THAT THE MEDICAL
EVIDENCE FROM DOCTORS HUGHES,
JONES, JUNG AND DOl\fM
UNANI1

•W:lf::.J .

Page
MODS THAT CATAPLEXY AND THE
SYMPTOMS EXPERIENCED BY MR.
RIDD, WERE MATERIAL TO THE RISK
ASSUMED BY APPELLANT ........................ 13

POINT V
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT THE TRIAL COURT BY ITS INSTRUCTION 13 READ THE FRAUD REQUIREMENT INTO THE ENTIRE §3119-8 WHEREAS THE STATUTE RAISES
THE DEFENSES OF MATERIALITY
AND GOOD FAITH REFUSAL IN ADDITION TO FRAUD ................................................. 14
POINT VI
THECOURTOVERLOOKEDTHEFACT
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL
TO GIVE APPELLANT'S INSTRUCTION
NUMBER 14 PERMITTED THE JURY
ERRONEOUSLY TO BASE ITS VERDICT ON A FINDING THAT CATAPLEXY WAS NOT MATERIAL TO THE
RISK SINCE THE CAUSE OF DEATH
WAS A HEART ATTACK ................................. 15
CASES CITED
Burnham v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,

24 U.2d 277, 470 P.2d 261 (1970) ............ 4, 5, 6

Callahan v. Salt Lake City,

41U300,125P863(1912) ..............................

5

Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Martin,
283 U.S. 209 51 S. Ct. 453 ( 1931) .................... 11
11

Page
Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc.,
17 U.2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 ( 1965) -------------------- 16
Delaney v. Prudential Insurance Company of
America, 139 N.,V. 2d 48 (Wisc. 1966) ________ 12
Fjeseth v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
122 N.W. 2d 49 ("\Vise. 1963) ---------------------··· 11
Fleet Messenger Service v. Life Ins. Co. of North
America, 315 1'-..2d 593 (2nd Cir. 1963) -·--·----·-- 5
Jensen v. Logan City,
96 U 522, 88 P.2d 459 ( 1939) ·----------·---·--·------···10
Life Ins. Co. of Virgina v. Shifflet,
15
201 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1967) ··----···----···---···--·-·-·-·McKenzie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
411 F.2d (6th Cir. 1969) -------·---···----··----······---- 5
National Bank of the Republic v. Beckstead,
11, 13
250 P. 1033, 68 U. 421 ( 1968) ···--···-·····-----·
Page v. Federal Security Insurance Co.,
8 U.2d 226, 322 P.2d 666 (1958) -··-····------------10
United Founders Life Ins. Co. v. Carey,
12
363 S.W. 2d 236 (Tex. 1963) ····-··---····----··---·---STATUTES CITED
UCA 31-19-8 -···-·-··········-··--·--···-·-·--··
4, 7, 9, 14, 15, 17
Rule 76 (a) Utah R. Cv. Proc. ····-··-··-·---·--········---··9

ltl

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOAN B. :MOORE,

Respondent.

vs.

l
' Case No.

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
lf
CO.l\IPANY OF Al\IERICA,
.
Petitioner,

12388

PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IX SVPPORT THEREOF

Comes now, Prudential Insurance Company of
America, herein sometimes referred to as "Prudential,"
Petitioner, and respectfully petitions this Honorable
Court for a hearing and argument in the aboYe entitled
case. This petition is based upon the following grounds:

POINT I
THE CO-CRT OYERLOOKED THE APPLICATIOX AXD EFFECT OF §31-19-S(c)
1

POINT II
§31-19-8 WAS

CONSTRUED DIFFERENTLY
AT TWO SEPARATE TRIALS OF THIS CASE,
CALLING FOR CONSTRUCTION OF SAID
STATUTE BY THIS COURT
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION
THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO PROVE IT
WOULD NOT IN GOOD FAITH HA VE ISSUED THE POLICY
POINT IV
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE ESSENTIAL FACT THAT THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE FROM DOCTORS HUGHES, JONES,
JUNG AND DOMM WAS UNANIMOUS THAT
CATAPLEXY AND THE SYMPTOMS EXPERIENCED BY MR. RIDD, WERE MATERIAL TO THE RISK ASSUMED BY APPELLANT
POINT V
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT THE TRIAL COURT BY ITS INSTRUCTION 13 READ THE FRAUD REQUIREI\-1ENT
INTO THE ENTIRE §31-19-8 'VHEREAS THE
STATUTE RAISES THE DEFENSES OF MATERIALITY AND GOOD FAITH REFUSAL
IN ADDITION TO FRAUD
2

POINT VI
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S RE:FUSAL TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S INSTRUCTION
BER 14 PERMITTED THE JURY ERRONEOUSLY TO BASE ITS VERDICT ON A FINDING THAT CATAPLEXY WAS NOT MATERIAL TO THE RISK SINCE THE CAUSE
OF DEATH WAS A HEART ATTACK.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the judgment and opinion of the Court be re-examined and an
argument be permitted in the above entitled case.
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith.
THOMAS M. BURTON
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
Attorneys for Petitioner

M. BURTON, hereby certifies that he
is one of the attorneys for Petitioner, and that in his
opinion there is good cause to believe that the judgment
objected to is erroneous, and that the case ought to be
re-examined and argued as prayed for in said petition.
ti on.
17 day of December, 1971.
DATED this ____________

THO:MAS M. BURTON
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE APPLICATION AND EFFECT OF §31-19-8(c)
New §31-19-8 enacted in 1963, has never been construed by this court. The case at bar is, therefore, one
of first impression on the application and effect of §3119-8. Plaintiff tried and argued her case on the basis
that Ridd did not intend and had no motive to mislead
the defendant as to his health status. Plaintiff's argument would have been a valid defense under the old
statute and the Utah cases construing it. Without conceding the plaintiff's position, the new statute prevents
recovery if "the insurer in good faith would not have
issued the policy ... if the true facts had been known."
§31-19-8. This defense applies regardless of the applicant's innocence. Appellant's Brief pp. 23-30.
Notwithstanding the extensive authority cited by
defendant, the principal authority cited by the court to
support its ruling is Burnham v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 24 U .2d 277, 470 P .2d 261 ( 1970) .Although recently decided, the case is obsolete since the insurance
policy there in question was issued January 1, 1962,
prior to enactment of the current §31-19-8. In addition,
the evidence of refusal was not credible, it came from
attorneys for the insurer and the matter was decided
upon summary judgment in the presence of issues of
fact. Therefore, the part of the opinion relied upon by
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the court is clearly dicta, not being necessary to its
ruling. Callahan v. Salt Lake City, 41 U. 300, 125 P. 868
(1912).
Even were it not dicta, the language quoted from
Burnham has been consistently construed as requiring
only the insurer to demonstrate its practice, without
bringing in evidence from the industry generally. The
court in McKenzie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,
411 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1969) noted, as did Burnham,
that materiality was to be measured by the "action which
insurance companies generally would have taken on
the application, when acting in accordance with their
usual practice and usage, if the truth had been told."
The trial court, affirmed on appeal, awarded smnmary
judgment to the insurer based upon the answers to
written interrogatories by one of the insurer's underwriters, that had the true medical condition been divulged, the company would have refused to issue the
policy or have increased the premium. No other evidence
of general insurance practice was required. See also the
cases cite dat pp. 8, 9, 12 and 13 of Reply Brief. In
Fleet Messenger Service vs. Life Insurance Comparny
of North America, 315 F.2d 593 (2nd Cir. 1963), the
trial court was affirmed in awarding the insurer judgment notwithstanding the verdict even though the insurer had some indication that the applicant was misrepresenting his health condition. No showing was
required that other carriers would have been similarly
negligent.
The language quoted by the court from Burnham,
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although invoked as dealing with a comparable problem,
dealt in fact with the materiality of the risk. In the
case at bar, the materiality of cataplexy to the risk
was unanimously established by four doctors. Also,
Burnham, not construing the current §31-19-8, quite
properly did not consider subsection "c" and is, therefore, not pertinent to the issue at bar.
The application mailed to defendant was "clean".
Dr. Hughes was not mentioned; Dr. Jones allegedly
found Ridd in good health two months prior; and Dr.
Jung uncovered nothing. Accordingly, the policy was
issued quickly as a matter of routine. Had the diagnosis
of either Hughes or Jones, or the symptoms reported
to them been on the application, defendant would have
mailed to the doctors a standard inquiry form used by
most companies. (Appellant's Brief p. 13). Had inquiry been made no policy would have been extant at
the time of Ridd' s death, regardless of any evidence
of good faith refusal. This issue was not considered
by the court on appeal.
Furthermore, after return to defendant of the information which Ridd freely gave to Doctors Hughes
and Jones, its medical director would have declined the
application. That is not to say that Ridd would not
have been insurable as an epileptic or on some other
basis. It is to say that this policy, at its stated face
amount and premium rate, would not have been issued.
That is all the statute requires Prudential to prove. It
did so. No question was raised about the credibility of
Dr. Domm' s conclusion and none can be.
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POINT II
§31-19-8 'VAS CONSTRUED DI.FFERENTL Y
AT TWO SEPARATE TRIALS OF THIS CASE,
CALLING FOR CONSTRUCTION OF SAID
STATUTE BY THIS COURT
Plaintiff's claim was tried to a jury before the
Honorable Merrill C. Faux on lVIarch 27, 1970. Because
the jury was unable, after several hours deliberation,
to reach a verdict, the case was retried before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft on November 30, 1970, resulting
in a verdict for the plaintiff. Judge Faux's instructions
numbers 14 and 15 clearly detailed the statutory rights
of the parties. ( R. 154-155) Instruction number 15
states:
Pursuant to Section 31-19-8, UCA 1953, quoted
in full in instruction number 14, if you find from
a preponderance of the evidence that any misrepresentation, omission, concealment of facts, or
incorrect statement was either material to the
insurance company's acceptance of the risk of
insuring the life of the applicant or that the
insurance company in good faith would not have
issued the policy if the true facts had been made
known to it as required by the application, then
you must find in favor of the insurance company
even if you find from a preponderance of the
evidence that there were no fraudulent statements or omissions as to the application. (R155)
A similar instruction was requested of Judge Croft by
the defendant. (Defendant's Requested Instruction
Number 7, R. 218). Judge Croft, in refusing it, noted
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thereon that the instruction was given in substance.
(R. 218) Not only was the instruction not given in
substance, the exact contrary of the instruction was
given by Judge Croft's Instruction Number 13 to which
defendant strenuously objected. (R. 240). The difference in the court's instructions to the two juries is fundamental. Judge Faux's instructions 14 and 15 (R.
154-155) followed the statute literally to the effect that
an omission or incorrect statement on the application
will defeat recovery if material to acceptance of the
risk or if the insurer would not have issued the policy,
regardless of the applicant's intent. Judge Croft's interpretive instructions 13 and 14 required the jury to
find that if Ridd's omissions were innocent, defendant
must pay and that even if intentional, defendant must
pay unless it showed that most insurers would not have
paid either. (R. 240-243) The difference is amply
illustrated by the dialogue between Judge Croft and
counsel for defendant:
MR. BURTON: He may, in fact, have had no
intention of misrepresentation or omission, et
cetera. He may have made them or failed to make
the disclosure in ignorance.
THE COURT: Well, do you think that the
law is that if an applicant just doesn't happen to
remember, that it has just left his mind at the
time this is made, so that there is no thought
about it on his part, that nevertheless would let
the insurance company off-if he totally and
completely innocent of something that he forgot
about completely?
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MR. BURTON: I think that's the state of tht
law . . . (R. 468)
In addition, Judge Faux's instruction 14 (R. 154)
quoted subsection "c" of the statute in its entirety,
whereas Judge Croft's interpretive instructions 13 and
14 omitted much of subsection "c". (R. 240-243) Because of the omissions of part of the statute, the jury
was not aware that even if defendant had issued a policy
to Ridd at a higher premium or in a different amount,
recovery would have been defeated. Because of the
omissions from the instructions the jury could have
presumed that Prudential, although it would have
refused the policy at bar, might have issued another
at a higher rate or lesser amount so that Ridd, even had
he fully disclosed his symptoms, would have been covered
anyway.
Rule 76 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires this court to give concisely the reasons for its
decision. The meaning of the current §31-19-8, construed
differently by two district court judges, yet overlooked
by this court on appeal, should be squarely faced and
decided, in order to enlighten the district courts, the bar
and potential parties to similar disputes.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION
THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO PROVE IT
'VOULD NOT IN GOOD FAITH HAVE ISSUED THE POLICY
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The court is in error in holding that Dr. Domm's
testimony amounted to a "post-mortem conjecture"
which the jury could disregard, leaving defendant without proof that its refusal would have been in good faith.
(Opinion p. 3)
First of all, Dr. Domm's testimony was not conjecture. It was based on the medical nature of cataplexy and the underwriting effect obviously flowing
therefrom. Secondly, if it were conjecture, it is one
that the statute permits. Both Dr. Domm's testimony
and the court's opinion follow the statutory wording:
"It would not have issued the policy." (Opinion p. 3).
Thirdly, the cases cited in footnote 4 of the opinion
are not in point since Dr. Domm' s testimony was not
founded in "ignorance, confusion, mistake, bias, or
falsehood." Jensen v. Logan City, 96 U. 522, 88 P.2d
459 ( 1939). (Opinion p. 4). Nor was there any evidence of bias, prejudice, self interest or anything incredible about his testimony. Page v. Federal Security
Insurance Co., 8 U .2d 226, 332 P .2d 666 ( 1958) .
(Opinion p. 4.) The line is clearly drawn in Page:
The traditional and well established rule is: the
fact trier, in this instance the jury, has the prerogative of juding credibility of witnesses and
the weight to be given the evidence. This admittedly would not go so far as to permit it to
arbitrarily disregard credible uncontradicted evidence. (emphasis added).
This court finds Dr. Domm's testimony "suffused
with self-interest". (Opinion p. 4). There is no evidence
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showing self-interest and the court cites none. Dr. Domm
is a physician of reputation and experience, a professor
of medicine, and medical director of defendant. No
pecuniary interest of Dr. Domm was shown in the outcome of the litigation, and it does not appear to what
higher position in Prudential Dr. Domm could aspire.
This court, unable to demonstrate that Dr. Domm's
testimony was suffused with self-interest, relies silently
and solely upon the mere fact of Dr. Domm's employ
by defendant. Utah has adopted the rule laid down
by the U.S. Supreme Court that mere employment
of the witness by one of the parties, even as its president, is not alone sufficient ground for permitting the
jury to disregard his testimony "under the guise of
passing upon the credibility of a witness ... " Chesapeake &0. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 51 S. Ct.
453 ( 1931) ; National Bank of the Republic v. Beckstead, 250 P. 1033, 68 U. 421 (1968). Appellant's
Brief, pp. 32-33, Appellant's Reply Brief p. 13.
Aside from ignoring its own rule of law, the court
ignores the authorities cited by Appellant at pages 8,
9, 12, and 13 of its Reply Brief to the effect that the
insurer's uncorroborated and uncontradicted testimony
that a policy would not have been issued upon the undisclosed or misrepresented facts, compels as a matter
of law, judgment in its favor. Once the insurer has so
testified, the burden shifts to the insured to show that
such a refusal would not have been in accord with the
practice generally followed by insurance companies.
Fjeseth v. New York Life Insurance Company, 122
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N.W. 2d 49 ('Vise. 1963); United Founders Life Insurance Company v. Carey, 363 S.,V. 2d 236 (Tex.
1963); Delaney v. Prudential Imurance Company of
America, 139 N.W. 2d 48 ('Vise. 1966); Reply Brief
pp. 12-13.
This court holds that it would be "difficult if not
impossible" for plaintiff to refute Dr. Domm's testimony
of good faith refusal. (Opinion p. 4). This is not so.
Plaintiff could have cross-examined Dr. Domm or
have called any insurer to refute defendant's practice.
The reason she did not do so is that an attempt to
prove that any carrier would insure the life of a cataplectic and a normal person on the same basis would
have been futile.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether, because of its
infrequency, any carrier would have had an established
underwriting practice with respect to cataplexy. Dr.
Domm explained that if cataplexy had been revealed,
the application would have been forwarded to the medical department for evaluation because the underwriting
department would not have been familiar with the disorder. (R. 441) His personal responsibility would have
been to evaluate the increased risk factor presented
by the symptoms. (R. 446) He would have declined
the policy for the reasons that he and the other doctors
fully explained having to do with the nature, unpredictability and uncontrollability of the attacks. ( Appellant's Brief p. 23). Dr. Domm's testimony is, therefore, intrinsically probable and crediible. Plaintiff
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made no attempt to attack it. It must stand and as a
matter of law compels judgment for defendant.
National Bank of the Republic v. Beckstead, supra.
POINT IV
. THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE ESSENTIAL FACT THAT THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE
DOCTORS HUGHES, JONES,
JUNG AND DOM.NI WAS UNANIMOUS THAT
CATAPLEXY AXD THE SYMPTOMS EXPERIENCED BY MR. RIDD, WERE MATERIAL TO THE RISK ASSUMED BY APPELLANT
This Court found that the omissions and incorrect
statements claimed by defendant with respect to Ridd's
answers were two: the visit to Dr. Hughes and the
visit to Dr. Jones. (Opinion p. 3). The most severe
omission, however, was the symptoms themselves.
(Question number 10 on the application). All four
doctors agreed that Ridd's symptoms, although not lifethreatening in a medical sense, increased the risk of
injury or fatality, depending upon the time and place
of an attack. (Appellant's Brief p. 23). It cannot be
seriously contended, either under the unanimous evidence in this regard, or as a matter of judicial notice,
that Ridd's symptoms did not present Prudential with
an increased risk as to loss of life. This court must
have overlooked the fact that sudden, uncontrollable
loss of muscle tone increases the risk of fatality and is

13

therefore, under the statute, material to the risk assumed by Prudential. The issue of materiality to the
risk was not decided by Prudential after Ridd' s death.
The materiality of cataplexy to the risk of death is,
under the evidence, an uncontroverted medical fact that
neither a jury nor this court is entitled to disregard.
Where a fact not disclosed is material to the risk, no
more is needed under §31-19-8 to defeat recovery.
POINT V
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT THE TRIAL COURT BY ITS INSTRUCTION 13 READ THE FRAUD REQUIREMENT
INTO THE ENTIRE §31-19-8 'VHEREAS THE
STATUTE RAISES THE DEFENSES OF MATERIALITY AND GOOD FAITH REFUSAL
IN ADDITION TO FRAUD
The trial court by its instruction number 13, told
the jury that if Ridd were of innocent motive, Prudential could not defeat recovery. (Appellant's Brief pp.
20-22, 43; Appellant's Reply Brief p. 16). Under that
instruction, unless and until Prudential proved that
Ridd intentionally or carelessly failed to disclose his
symptoms, the defens es of materiality and good faith
refusal would not come into play. This court apparently
holds the view that Ridd's nondisclosure was innocent
because his affliction was minor. Even if innocent and
minor, the statute gave Prudential the right to look at
Ridd and refuse him, so long as it did so in good faith
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or so long as his medical condition were material to
the risk. Prudential never had its statutory right because
the trial court told the jury that Ridd's nondisclosure
must be "intentional" in order to come within §31-19-8
and hence, to defeat recovery. Life Insurance Comp<ltny
of Virginia v. Shifflet, 201 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1967)
construed a Florida statute identical to §31-19-8. It
ruled:
We hold misrepresentations in an application for
insurance, material to the acceptance of the risk,
do not have to be made with knowledge of the
incorrectness and untruth to vitiate the policy.
This conclusion appears to be in harmony with
the general rule approved in other jurisdictions.
The jury, under the court's instruction number 13,
had to find that if Ridd's nondisclosure were innocent,
Prudential could not cancel. Upon proper instruction,
the verdict would have had to be different. Accordingly,
it must be set aside. This court, in any event did not
review Appellant's contention that giving instruction
number 13 was prejudicial error.
POINT VI
THE COURT OVERLOOKED THE FACT
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 14 PERMITTED THE JURY ERRONEOUSLY TO BASE ITS VERDICT ON A FINDING THAT CATAPLEXY WAS NOT MATERIAL TO THE RISK SINCE THE CAUSE
OF DEATH 'VAS A HEART ATTACK.
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Ridd' s alleged heart attack is not relevant to whether
or not the omission of cataplexy was material to the
risk assumed by Appellant. Yet the trial court over
objection, admitted evidence as to the cause of death
and refused to instruct the jury that the cause of death
was irrelevant. Appellant's Brief pp. 23-26, 41. It
makes no difference in this case that Ridd died of a heart
attack and had no heart trouble. The problem is that
the jury probably concluded that it did make a difference. The natural tendency was for the jury to find
that since cataplexy had no bearing on Ridd's death,
Prudential should pay. There is a reasonable likelihood
that had the evidence been excluded or a proper instruction given relative to the cause of death, the jury
might have reached a different result. Day v. Lorenzo
Smith & Son, Inc., 17 U.2d 221, 408 P. 2d 186 (1965).
Accordingly, the jury was not confined to the
statute but was free to ramble into an appealing non
sequitor to the prejudice of defendant. This issue
raised by Appellant numerous times through the length
of these proceedings, was not reviewed on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Under the evidence, the only issues to be decided
are the legal issues of materiality and good faith refusal
as stated by the statute. There is no dispute that Ridd
had sudden attacks of loss by muscle control, that defendant issued the policy in ignorance of them and that
had it known of them, it would have sent out medical
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inquiries and upon the undisputed medical information,
declined this coverage. Prudential is not a public utility
required to insure all who sincerely apply. §31-19-8
compels judgment in favor of Prudential as a matter
of law.
Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS M. BURTON
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& McCARTHY
Attorneys for Petitioner
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